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In the 1994 elections, in a movement born of fiscal austerity and nativism,
Americans decided to strip aliens of eligibility for a host of basic government
services. Californians flocked to the polls to block illegal aliens from attending
public schools, receiving prenatal care, or enjoying most other government
benefits.' Two embattled governors-California Republican Pete Wilson and
Florida Democrat Lawton Chiles-swept back to power as champions of the
new fiscal exclusivity.2 Republicans, who catapulted to control of the U.S.
Congress for the first time in forty years, campaigned on a promise to cut
government aid to legal aliens as part of their Contract with America.3
1. Proposition 187, a citizens' ballot initiative, passed by a 3-2 margin, but was immcdiatcly subjected
to court challenges that temporarily barred its implementaton. Paul Feldman & Rich Connell. Wilson Acts
To Enforce Parts of Prop. 187; 8 Lawsuits Filed. L.A. TIMES. Nov. 10. 1994. at Al.
2. Wilson was an early and enthusiastic supporter of Proposition 187 and advocated curtailing almost
all government services to illegal aliens. See infra note 46. By contrast. Chiles focused not on eliminating
services to illegal aliens, but on making the federal government pick up the tab. Mark Silva. Immigration
Suit Seeks $1 Billion, MIAMI HERALD., Apr. 10. 1994. at IA. While Chiles did cut foster care service to
illegal aliens, Larry Rohter, Florida Opens New Front in Fight on hmmigration Policy. N Y Ti.MIES. Feb.
10, 1994, at A14, Chiles said after his reelection that he would oppose a Proposition 187 measure in
Florida, Jay Hamburg, Aliens Target of Committee: Group Wants Iote on Immigration Measure. OR.ANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. I1, 1995, at 21A.
3. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT wNmi AMERICA 73-74 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schcllhas eds.
1994); Robert Pear. Deciding Who Gets What in Amnerica, N Y. TIMES. Nov 27. 1994. § 4, at 5
("Republicans reckon that they can save more than S21 billion over five years by bamng legal immigrants
from 60 programs, including Medicaid. food stamps and welfare.").
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Today's animosity toward aliens is driven by the potent interplay of dollars
and demographics.4 Many citizens perceive aliens to be a drain on America's
scarce government resources, absorbing more in services than they pay in
taxes. Justified or not, these fears have mounted with a demographic wave.
More immigrants entered the United States in the 1980's than in any other
decade in American history.5 During the last two decades, the number of
noncitizens,6 including both legal aliens and illegal aliens,7 more than tripled,
soaring from 3.5 million in 1970 to 11.8 million in 1990.8 Many of those
noncitizens have clustered in a few areas, especially South Florida and
Southern California. In 1990, Florida's Dade County led the nation with the
highest percentage of adult noncitizens, 32.8%. 9 Los Angeles County came
next with 26.9% adult noncitizens, compared to 5.7% for the country as a
whole. t
Today's anti-immigrant fever first surfaced in California and Florida,
stoked by their high concentrations of noncitizens, and remains most
pronounced there. Both states have chafed under the financial burden of
4. This dynamic is exacerbating America's growing insecurity about its global competitiveness and
its ability to assimilate today's immigrants, most of whom are not of European origin. See generally JOHN
HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATrERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (2d cd. 1974)
(explaining types of factors that contribute to outbursts of American nativism).
5. From 1981 to 1990, 7,338,062 immigrants were lawfully admitted into the United States.
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE., 1991 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF TIE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 27 tbl. 1 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 STATISTICAL Y.B.J. That
total does not include 1,123,162 aliens who applied for legalization under the amnesty provision of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, but whose applications
were not approved until 1991. 1991 STATISTICAL Y.B., supra, at 34 tbl. 4. In all, 8,467,224 immigrants
entered during the 1980's or filed a successful application for legalization. Id. at 27 tbl. 1, 34 tbl. 4. In
addition, an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 illegal immigrants entered the United States each year during
the 1980's. Robert Reinhold, Conflicting Figures on IllegalAliens, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1987, at Al6. Thus
a very conservative estimate is that 9.5 million immigrants-legal and illegal-entered the United States
during the 1980's. The next-highest level of immigration took place from 1901 to 1910, a decade during
which 8,795,386 immigrants were admitted into the United States. 1991 STATISTICAL Y.B., supra, at 27
tbl. 1.
6. The terms "noncitizens" and "aliens" are used to refer to legal and illegal aliens, collectively.
7. There are three main categories of aliens: legal permanent resident aliens, nonimmigrant aliens, and
illegal aliens. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines legal permanent resident aliens as follows: "The
term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the
privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration
laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(20) (1988). Aliens with a valid nonimmigrant
visa such as a tourist or student visa receive permission to stay in the United States temporarily. 8 U.S.C.
§ l101(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (listing different types of nonimmigrant aliens). Illegal aliens,
sometimes called undocumented workers, include aliens who entered illegally and aliens who stayed after
their temporary visas expired. Other aliens, such as otherwise illegal aliens with valid asylum claims
pending, fall between the three main categories. This Note will use the term "legal alien" as shorthand for
legal permanent resident aliens.
8. SUSAN J. LAPHAM, U.S. BUREAU OFTIE CENSUS, THE FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1990, at I tbl. 1 (1992) [hereinafter FOREIGN BORN POPULATION]. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service estimated that in October 1992, about 3.4 million illegal aliens were in the United
States. Congressional Commission Calls for Crackdown on Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at A8.
9. ETHNIC & HISPANIC BRANCH, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 AGE, NATIVITY, AND
CITIZENSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES, STATES, AND COUNTIES 8 tbl. I (1990) [hereinafter AGE, NATIVITY,
AND CITIZENSHIP].
10. Id. at 5 tbl. 1.
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providing legal and illegal aliens with free public schooling, emergency
medical care, and beds in state prisons. Both states claim they have spent
billions of dollars providing services to aliens, legal and illegal," and have
sued the federal government to recoup the money they have spent, claiming the
federal government should bear the burden of lax enforcement of the nation's
immigration laws.
1 2
Not coincidentally, two of the most contested voting rights cases in recent
years came from Los Angeles and Dade Counties.1 3 A pivotal issue in each
case was whether the principle of one person one vote means local districts"
should contain equal numbers of persons, including citizens and aliens, or only
equal numbers of citizens.' 5 In both cases, Hispanic 6 plaintiffs claimed the
latest reapportionment plan deprived them of their fair share of political power
and sued under the Voting Rights Act. 7 Elected officials countered that many
Hispanics were noncitizens who should be excluded from the population base
for drawing voting districts or calculating compliance with the Voting Rights
Act.
The political stakes in such cases are considerable. Excluding noncitizens
from the local apportionment base means shifting political power away from
11. Florida estimates that it spends S884 million a year on schools, hospitals. prisons, and other public
services for illegal aliens. Mark Silva, Florida's Big Tab for Immigration. MIAMI HERALD. Mar. 13. 1994.
at IA, 20A. California estimates the drain on its budget at S3 billion annually. Daniel M. Wcmtraub. Wilson
Shifts Tack on Illegal Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25. 1993. at A3. The precise figures are hotly
debated. A study by the Urban Institute, a Washington-based research group, concluded that California had
overestimated its population of illegal aliens and had also overestimated the amount it spends on the
education of illegal immigrant children by S800 million. Deborah Sontag. Illegal Aliens Put Uneven Load
on States, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994. at A14. The same study found that legal and illegal
immigrants together are "a boon, not a burden, for the country over all. generating a surplus of S25 billion
to $30 billion." Id. But immigrants, legal and illegal, pose a financial burden on local governments because
most of the taxes immigrants pay go to the federal government while many of the services they receive
come from local governments. Larry Rohter. Revisiting Immigration and the Open-Door Policy. N.Y
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, § 4, at 4.
12. Silva, supra note II, at IA, 20A. Arizona and Texas have also sued the federal government to
recover the costs of providing public services to illegal immigrants. Sam Howe Verhovek. Texas Plans To
Sue U.S. over Illegal Alien Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at A10. A federal judge recently dismisscd
Florida's lawsuit, saying the suit presented a political question. Mireya Navarro. Floridas Plea for
Immigration Relief Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21. 1994, at A20.
13. Garza v. County of Los Angeles. 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal.). aff'd. 918 F2d 763 (9th Citr
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) [hereinafter Garzal; Dc Grandy v. Wetherell. 815 F Supp. 1550
(N.D. Fla. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. Dc Grandy. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994)
[hereinafter De Grandy]. De Grandy is about state legislative districts but the controversy centered on Dade
County. De Grandy, 114 S. CL at 2652. The Supreme Court has direct appellate junsdiction over district
court decisions in voting rights cases heard by a three-judge panel. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g) (1988)_
14. In this Note, "local" refers to state, county, and municipal government.
15. Another alternative, proposed in the Los Angeles case. is drawing distncts with an equal number
of voting-age citizens. See infra note 38.
16. Some people prefer the term "Latino" to the term "'Hispanic." which they feel glorifies the Spanish
conquest and overemphasizes their European roots. Mark McDonald. Term Limits: Hispanic Latno? A
National Debate Proves No One Name Pleases Everyone. DAL.AS MORNING NEWs. Jan. 13. 1993. at I C
Latino is more common in California while Hispanic is popular in Florida. Id. This Note uses the term
"Hispanic" for simplicity's sake without intending to take sides in the debate over terminology.
17. Garza, 918 F2d at 765; De Grand., 114 S. CL at 2651. The Voting Rights Act is codified at .12
U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973b (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The Yale Law Journal
areas with large populations of Hispanics or other immigrant groups. Excluding
noncitizens from the apportionment base in Florida, for instance, cuts Dade
County's share of the state population and so its entitlement to legislative seats
by more than 30%. Such cases are also part of a subtle effort to limit
government money flowing to both legal and illegal aliens. Shifting political
power from Dade County, for instance, means fewer legislators to demand a
fair share of government resources for their county. All of the county's
residents, aliens and citizens alike, will suffer as a result."8
Apportionment plans such as those in California and Florida provide a
ready precedent that may well be invoked frequently in coming years. 9 With
the anti-immigrant tide running higher than it has in decades, 20 sweeping both
legal and illegal immigrants in its wake, can a push to exclude noncitizens
from local apportionment bases be far behind? In this Note, I argue that
notwithstanding an early Supreme Court decision granting states considerable
latitude to define their apportionment base,2' excluding only legal aliens from
that base violates the Equal Protection Clause. To meet constitutional strict
scrutiny, states that want to exclude only legal aliens must demonstrate that
more than political or economic expediency underlies their decision; I argue
that states cannot carry that burden.
Part I explains why states might be tempted to exclude only aliens from
their apportionment base, as opposed to excluding all nonstate citizens, and
explores the hidden costs of doing so. Part II lays out the permissive legal
framework that grants states wide latitude in defining their apportionment bases
and demonstrates that the Supreme Court's decision making alienage a suspect
classification22 effectively limits that permissive framework. Part III sets forth
a limited exemption to strict scrutiny for alienage classifications-the political
function exception-explains its contours and demonstrates that this doctrine
would not permit states to exclude only legal aliens from their apportionment
base. Applying strict scrutiny, Part IV argues that states cannot constitutionally
exclude only legal aliens from their apportionment base. This Part concludes
that states that want to protect their citizens' right to electoral equality can only
do so by excluding all outsiders (e.g., nonresident military personnel, out-of-
town college students, transients) from their apportionment base; legal aliens
cannot be singled out for special treatment.
18. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
19. No local government currently excludes noncitizens from its apportionment base, but I anticipate
that local governments will face growing pressure to exclude noncitizens in the future.
20. See generally Al Martinez, California Elections: In These Violent 7imes, Fear Finds a Scapegoat,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at BI; Deborah Sontag, Across the U.S., Immigrants Find the Land of
Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1992, at Al; Deborah Sontag, Calls To Restrict Immigration Come from
Many Quarters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, § 4, at 5.
21. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
22. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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I. THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION
Putting constitutional issues aside temporarily, this Part outlines the
political dilemmas faced by communities with large alien populations,
illustrates the pressures that can lead to exclusion apart from a legitimate desire
to protect citizens' voting rights, and analyzes the consequences. While it may
be politically expedient to exclude only noncitizens from the local
apportionment base,23 doing so ultimately will hurt both legal aliens and their
citizen neighbors.24 Noncitizens who are excluded do not simply disappear
but continue to reside in the community just as before, consuming their share
of government services. The only clear result of exclusion is that a large
number of persons using government services will no longer be represented in
the legislature; consequently, their share of the public pie likely will be
reduced. The bottom line is that both legal aliens and their citizen neighbors
will suffer as everyone competes for a slice of that dwindling pie. Thus, this
Part reaches on policy grounds what at first blush seems a counterintuitive
conclusion: Local governments should not treat legal aliens any differently than
they treat their own citizens in defining their apportionment base. The
remainder of this Note reaches a similar conclusion on constitutional grounds.
A. Two Cases Excluding Aliens from the Population Base
The Los Angeles County apportionment battle in Garza v. County of Los
Angeles presents a classic example of what excluding noncitizens from the
local apportionment base would mean. In 1988, Yolanda Garza and other
Hispanic voters sued the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, charging
that the supervisors' latest reapportionment plan unfairly diluted the voting
power of Hispanic citizens. 5 The federal district court agreed, and when the
23. Local governments that want to protect their ciuzens' voting strength should exclude all outsiders
from their apportionment base-noncitizens, out-of-town students, nonresident military personnel,
incarcerated felons, and similar groups-not just legal aliens. See infra notes 135-45 and accompanying
text. Thus, this Note does not consider a desire to protect citizens* voting power as a justification for
excluding only legal aliens from the local apportionment base.
24. This Part analyzes the policy consequences of the most likely exclusionary proposal: excluding
all aliens, legal and illegal, from the local apportionment base. The identical analysis would apply in the
unlikely case that a local government tried to exclude only legal aliens from its apportionment base.
Another possibility would be to exclude only illegal aliens from the local apportionment base. No local
government has tried to do so, however, probably in large part because it is extremely difficolt. if not
impossible, to count illegal aliens accurately. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text. Even in this
case, similar policy considerations would apply but with less force because illegal aliens receive few
government services. Under federal law, local governments can deprive illegal aliens of almost all
government benefits, except the right to receive emergency medical care and the nght to attend public
schools. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(l)-(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
The legal analysis for proposals to exclude all aliens is similar to the legal analysis for proposals to
exclude only legal aliens. See infra note 92. The legal analysis, however, would be quite different for
proposals to exclude only illegal aliens. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
25. Garza, 918 F.2d at 765.
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county refused to offer an acceptable plan, the court redistricted on its own in
order to create a safe Hispanic seat. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
upheld the court-ordered redistricting plan that created districts with equal
numbers of people but sharply varying numbers of citizens.26 Such a plan,
presented in the table below, was the only way to create a safe Hispanic
seat,27 given the demographics of Los Angeles County in which one in two
Hispanic adults was not a citizen in 1990.28







TABLE 1. Demographic Breakdown of Los Angeles County by District
The court-ordered apportionment plan showed how two prized American
values, electoral equality and equal representation, can conflict in areas with
large noncitizen populations. Electoral equality rests on the principle that the
voting power of all eligible voters should be weighted equally29 and requires
drawing voting districts to include equal numbers of citizens.3" The slightly
26. The district court decision is unpublished. The details of the district court plan, however, are
summarized in the Ninth Circuit decision. lId at 774 nn.4-5.
27. Petition for Certiorari at 7-8, County of Los Angeles v. Garza, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), filed,
59 U.S.L.W. 3421 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1990) (No. 90-849) ("It is undisputed that if one uses either citizenship
or voting age citizenship instead of total population as the apportionment base, one cannot form a majority
Hispanic voting age citizen district in 1980 or 1990.").
28. Garza, 918 F.2d at 774 nn.4-5. Less than 45% of the Hispanic adults in Los Angeles County were
citizens. Petition for Certiorari at 8, Garza (No. 90-849). In Dade County, less than 50% of the Hispanic
adults were citizens. Appellants' Brief at 19, De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (No. 92-519).
In Garza, Hispanics made up 59.4% of the eligible voters in the safe Hispanic district. Garza, 918
F.2d at 778, 779 n.2 (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part). If the district court had drawn
districts with equal numbers of citizens, the district would have contained nearly twice as many eligible
voters, and Hispanics would almost certainly not have made up a majority of the district's eligible voters.
29. While it holds a powerful allure in both our political and legal discourse, electoral equality is
unattainable in practice. As several commentators have noted, the American winner-take-all system cuts
against a commitment to electoral equality, for the votes of people who back the losing candidate are totally
discarded. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1358-61 (1987); see also PAUL BREST & SANFORD
LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECIsIONMAKING 1087-93 (3d ed. 1992) (explaining what true
electoral equality entails).
30. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) ("Weighting the votes of citizens differently,
by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable.").
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different concept of equal representation means ensuring that
everyone-citizens and noncitizens alike-is represented equally and requires
drawing districts with equal numbers of residents.' Equal representation is
animated by the ideal that all persons, voters and nonvoters alike, are entitled
to a political voice, however indirect or muted.32 These two ideals are usually
complementary but lead to divergent results in areas, like Los Angeles and
Dade Counties, with large noncitizen populations.
The plan in Garza placed equal representation above electoral equality to
remedy past discrimination against Hispanic voters. The five-member Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors claimed the district court's plan
impermissibly diluted the voting power of non-Hispanic citizens, violating their
right to electoral equality, because the number of citizens in three non-Hispanic
districts vastly exceeded the number of citizens in the safe Hispanic district.
The county argued that in those three districts each citizen's vote was worth
less than a vote in the safe Hispanic district.33 Drawing districts with equal
numbers of citizens, however, would have splintered the Hispanic vote. It also
would have meant that the total number of residents in the Hispanic district
would have far surpassed the number of residents in the other districts to the
all-but-certain detriment of the inhabitants of the Hispanic district.
A 1971 redistricting plan for the Los Angeles City Council, a plan rejected
by the California Supreme Court nearly two decades before Garza, suggests
how districts for the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors would have
come out had they been drawn to ensure electoral equality." The following
table ranks the districts from that old plan, in descending order, by number of
residents:
35
31. Id. at 560-61 ("Mhe fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one
of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex. economic status, or place
of residence within a State.") (emphasis added).
32. Like electoral equality, equal representation holds a powerful allure in our political and legal
discourse but is also a troubling concept because neither political theorists, nor legal commentators, nor
Supreme Court Justices have been able to define the concept clearly. See. e.g.. Lucas v. General Assembly.
377 U.S. 713, 748-49 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing theones of representation);
REPRESENTATION (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968) (same). Questions remain.
including: Do elected officials represent everyone in their districts or only the people who voted for them?
Is someone ineligible to vote-a minor or an alien-represented simply by being included in the
apportionment base? Are ineligible voters represented vicariously by virtue of their relation to a citizen
voter? Is the key value equal representation for individuals or for groups? Is it important to be represented
by a particular elected official, the dominant political party, or the legislature as a whole?
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying table.
34. See Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 481 P.2d 489, 495 (Cal. 1971). Under the court-rejcctEd
1971 plan, the city council drew districts with an eye to equalizing the number of registered voters per
district without worrying about the number of inhabitants per district.
35. Id. at 495-96.
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TABLE 2. Pre-Garza Plan Based on Electoral Equality
The California Supreme Court noted that District 9, which had nearly 70%
more inhabitants than District 4, was populated mostly by blacks (many of
whom were not registered to vote) and Mexican-Americans (many of whom
were not citizens). In rejecting the plan, which the court held was
constitutionally suspect since it diminished minority representation, 6 the court
stressed the importance of creating districts with a comparable number of total
residents:
[M]uch of a legislator's time is devoted to providing services and
information to his constituents, both voters and nonvoters. A district
which, although large in population, has a low percentage of
registered voters would, under a voter-based apportionment, have
fewer representatives to provide such assistance and to listen to
concerned citizens.37
36. Id. at 495.
37. Id. at 494.
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Two decades later, the Ninth Circuit employed similar arguments in Garza,
upholding the district court plan as a justified remedial measure, after
concluding that members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors had
intentionally splintered the Hispanic vote in order to protect their
incumbency.3 The majority also emphasized that drawing districts with equal
numbers of eligible voters but sharply varying numbers of residents would
burden the constitutional right of residents in the more populous districts to
petition the government for redress of grievances. 9
Similar to its California counterpart, the Florida redistricting case began
in 1992 with a legal challenge lodged by Dade County's increasingly powerful
Hispanic community, led by Miguel De Grandy, a Hispanic state legislator.'
The plaintiffs claimed that the legislature's reapportionment plan violated the
Voting Rights Act,4' arguing that the plan should have created three more
safe Hispanic seats in Dade County.42 In defending the status quo, leaders of
the state legislature countered that De Grandy's calculations to determine
compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act were based on the number
of Hispanic residents, not Hispanic citizens.43 The state argued that creating
more safe Hispanic seats beyond those included in the state's plan would
provide overrepresentation for Hispanic citizens and underrepresentation for
non-Hispanic citizens because of the large Hispanic noncitizen population in
38. Garza, 918 F.2d at 770-71. The majority also noted that a California statute establishing an
inclusive apportionment base for local election districts meant that legal and illegal alicns had to be
included in the county's apportionment base. Id. at 774 (citing CAL ELEC. CODE § 35000 (Vest 1989 &
Supp. 1995)). Judge Kozinski, concurring in part and dissenting in pan, agreed with the county that the
court plan was unconstitutional, id. at 778, 779. and said that if a remedial plan could not be devised with
relatively equal numbers of eligible voters and total residents, then the county would probably have to draw
its districts to equalize the number of eligible voters. id. at 781-85.
39. Id. at 774-75. The court noted: "Basing districts on voters rather than total population results in
serious population inequalities across districts. Residents of the more populous distncts thus have less
access to their elected representative." Id at 774. The court continued: *'Interference with individuals' free
access to elected representatives impermissibly burdens their right to petition the government." Id. at 775
It concluded: "'Adherence to a population standard, rather than one based on registered voters, is more
likely to guarantee that those who cannot or do not cast a ballot may still have some votce in government."'
Id. (quoting Calderon, 481 P.2d at 493).
40. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2651.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973b (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42. De Grandy, 114 S. C. at 2652.
43. Id. at 1566. Unlike the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors, the Florida legislature did not propose
excluding noncitizen Hispanics from the local apportionment base. Rather. the legislature proposed
excluding noncitizen Hispanics from the population base used to calculate compliance with Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, which establishes an effects test for determining if a protected minority group's
voting strength is being unfairly diluted. As interpreted in Thornburg v. Gingles. 478 U.S. 30. 50 (1986).
the Voting Rights Act establishes a threshold test for any group bnnging a Section 2 claim. To meet the
threshold test, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are sufficiently numerous, politically unified, and
geographically compact to elect a candidate of their choosing with fairly drawn districts. Id. at 50. An
unsettled question is whether plaintiffs can rely on data about minority residents, including noncitizens, or
must use data about minority citizens alone to establish a Section 2 claim. The Supreme Court did not reach
that issue in deciding the Florida case. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2660 n.14.
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Dade County." The Supreme Court sidestepped the controversy, deciding the
case on other grounds.45
Like the Los Angeles case, the Florida litigation was most obviously a
political battle, this time pitting Dade County's burgeoning Hispanic
community against the dwindling number of non-Hispanic legislators in Dade
County and their political allies from central and northern Florida. At stake
were the distribution of seats between Hispanics and non-Hispanics in Dade
County and the balance of power statewide between Hispanics and non-
Hispanics. The litigation was also an economic battle over the distribution of
government resources, for a shift in political power inevitably would have
altered Hispanics' share of government services and benefits.
B. The Temptation To Exclude Noncitizens
As the Los Angeles and Dade County cases suggest, excluding noncitizens
from the local apportionment base or from the population base for calculating
compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a tempting strategy for
incumbent politicians fearful of losing their seats to a growing immigrant
community. Such a strategy not only promises to preserve incumbents' seats
but can also be politically popular, playing to the anti-immigrant sentiment of
the larger political community. Excluding noncitizens has the added political
appeal of channeling government benefits away from noncitizens. The stronger
the anti-immigrant backlash, the more alluring such a strategy becomes. It is
no coincidence that incumbent politicians tried to exclude noncitizen Hispanics
in California and Florida, two states in which anti-immigrant fury was so
pronounced that it helped propel embattled governors to reelection.46
Florida and California are political bellwethers for the country on
immigration issues, but they are not unique. An anti-immigrant mood has
44. Appellants' Brief at 30 n.49, De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (No. 92-519).
45. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2660 n.14.
46. Wilson's popularity with Californians had plummeted to an all-time low when he began his anti-
immigrant campaign, a key to his revived political fortunes. Wilson proposed, among other measures,
stripping children of illegal aliens of their right to U.S. citizenship, barring children in the country illegally
from attending public schools, and barring illegal aliens from receiving all but emergency medical
assistance. See James Bornemeier, Charting Wilson's Transformation on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
2, 1994, at A3; Bill Stall & Patrick J. McDonnell, Wilson Urges Stiff Penalties To Deter Illegal Immigrants,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at Al; Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Ad Sparks Charges of Immigrant-Bashing,
L.A. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at BI; Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Plans Immigration Offensive, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1994, at A16.
In Florida, Chiles was also at the nadir of his popularity when he seized on the anti-immigrant
sentiment to resurrect himself politically. Chiles successfully pressured President Clinton to curtail the flow
of Cuban rafters to Florida. After Clinton halted the influx by interdicting rafters in international waters
and directing them to Guantanamo Naval Base, Chiles told a reporter covering Florida's heated
gubernatorial campaign: "The only thing I can tell you is if there were 30,000 more rafters in Florida, I'd
hate to be me running for office." Richard L. Berke, Gov. Chiles Seizes the Refugee Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1994, at A].
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seized the nation as a whole.47 The number of noncitizens is rising sharply
in metropolitan areas throughout the country, placing an added strain on
government services. 41 Other states already are contemplating following in
California's footsteps by adopting their own Proposition 187;"9 they are also
considering imitating Florida by deporting illegal aliens serving state jail terms
in order to save tax revenues and free up badly needed jail space.5° The same
potent dynamic of demographics and dollars that prompted efforts to exclude
noncitizens from the apportionment base in California and from the population
base for the Voting Rights Act in Florida could easily prompt similar efforts
in other states. Ours is an age dominated by the politics of scarcity, and if
states cannot increase the pie, they will be sorely tempted to limit the number
of seats at the table.
C. Policy Arguments Against Excluding Noncitizens
While politically enticing, excluding noncitizens from the local
apportionment base ultimately would hurt not only the noncitizens themselves
but also their citizen neighbors by distorting representation. Local governments
need an inclusive apportionment base to ensure that citizens and noncitizens
alike are represented, however indirectly, and to ensure an equitable
distribution of government goods to both citizens and noncitizens. In the past,
some states apportioned on a narrow population base such as voters or adult
males,51 but the representative function of the apportionment base was
47. B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Anti-Alien Movement Spreading in Wake of Californa 's Measure. N Y
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al (noting that supporters of Proposition 187 movement have begun pushing for
similar laws in other states with large populations of recently arrived aliens, such as Arizona. Florida.
Illinois, New York, and Texas); Richard L. Berke. Politicians Discovering an Issue. Immigration. N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at A19 (noting that polls show that Americans are increasingly worned about
economic impact of immigrants and their effect on American culture and that politicians are becoming
increasingly outspoken on immigration issues).
48. According to the 1990 census, for instance. 20.9% of the residents in Queens County. New York.
were not citizens. FOREIGN BORN POPULATION. supra note 8. at 7 ibl. 6. Other areas with large percentages
of noncitizens include: San Francisco County, California. 19.7%; Hudson County. New Jersey. 18.2%.
Kings County (Brooklyn), New York, 17.1%; El Paso County. Texas. 16%: New York County (Manhattan).
New York, 15.5%. Id.
49. Ayres, supra note 47, at Al, A42.
50. Deborah Sharp, Florida's Foreign Felons Now Facing Deportation. USA TODAY. June 30. 1994.
at 8A.
51. See David L. Anderson. Note, When Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Geriyrmanderng and
the Status Quo Ante, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1549, 1572 n.176 (1990) (citing IND. CONST. art. IV. § 5
(mandating state legislative apportionment on basis of number of males over 21 years of age; amended in
1984 to apportion by total number of inhabitants)); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17. § 1891 (1982)
(apportioning state legislature on basis of voters in previous election: amended in 1981 to apportion on
basis of total population).
New York's original constitution, adopted in 1777. limited the apportionment base for the lower house
of the state legislature to electors. N.Y. CONST. art. V (1777), reprinted in 5 FRANCIS NEvrmr.oN TIIORPE.
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrTUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 2623.
2629-30 (1909); see Ruth C. Silva, The Population Base for Apportionment of the New York Legislature.
32 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (1963). In 1821, the base was broadened to "'inhabitants. excluding aliens.
paupers, and persons of color not taxed." N.Y. CONST. art. 1. § 6 (1821). reprinted in THORPE. supra. at
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generally not undermined because such groups were distributed relatively
evenly.5 2 Today, all states and local governments have a relatively inclusive
apportionment base. 3 Such inclusivity, however, may be jeopardized by
exclusionary politics, as Garza and De Grandy demonstrate.
According to New York's highest court, it is "appropriate" for the
apportionment base to differ from and be more inclusive than the pool of
eligible voters, because "[t]he goals and objectives of the concepts differ
significantly. '54 Inclusion in the pool of eligible voters bestows the right to
exercise political power; inclusion in the apportionment base ensures a
modicum of representation. 5 Being included in the apportionment base
furthers representational equality, ensuring that even persons without the
franchise will have their needs and interests taken into account. Hawaii's 1991
Reapportionment Commission recently made a similar point, noting:
The focus of reapportionment is representation. Voting is merely one
of a number of ways in which a person's right to be represented is
manifested. The right to representation is a broader right of effective
participation in, and relation to, the legislative process, including the
right to petition the legislature, the right to bring one's needs to the
attention of a particular legislator who has been elected in that district,
and the right to be weighed in the composition of the legislature.
Those entitled to vote and those entitled to representation are not
necessarily the same.56
Those included in the apportionment base but unable to vote cannot influence
legislators directly; rather, they can only hope to sway legislators by virtue of
2639, 2641. In 1846, the plan was revised again by dropping the exclusion against paupers and increasing
the number of Senate districts. Silva, supra, at 7. The 1846 revision was a political compromise, an effort
to give New York and Kings Counties more power without giving them too much power. Counting all
inhabitants would have greatly increased the political power of these counties, where many blacks and
aliens lived; continuing to count only electors would have disproportionately disadvantaged these counties.
Id. at 7-8.
52. But see Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 90 (1966) (stating that Oahu's share of Hawaii's total
population was 79% while its share of registered voters was 73%).
53. Some states or local governments, however, do exclude nonresident students or out-of-state military
personnel. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
54. Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 628 N.E.2d 1316, 1320 (N.Y. 1993).
55. A similar point was made during the congressional debates over setting the Fourteenth
Amendment's formula for apportioning congressional districts. The congressional debates indicated that
Congress viewed apportionment as reflecting all people, not just voters. Senator Johnson of Maryland,
responding to one of his colleagues, observed:
The honorable member seems to suppose that representation and the franchise are identical.
They are as different as light from darkness. The Constitution says so; your own amendment
proclaims it. You say that representation is to depend upon numbers. So did your fathers say
so. They said it and you have followed their teaching, because they said it was a right to be
represented, but not a right to vote.
Marsha Bilzin, Note, Reapportionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Representation or
Equal Vote?, 50 B.U. L. REv. 231, 243 (1970) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3029 (1866)).
56. STATE OF HAWAII 1991 REAPPORTIONMENT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT AND REAPPORTIONMENT
PLAN 22 (1992) (hereinafter HAWAII REAPPORTIONMENT COMM'N),
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their relationship to an eligible voter or their mere presence in a legislator's
district. Such representation is called virtual representation."
American colonists scorned the very notion of virtual representation when
the British claimed Americans were represented in the British parliament by
virtue of their relation to English voters. 8 Virtual representation is
constitutionally barred today as a substitute for direct representation for citizens
eligible to vote.5 9 But virtual representation is esteemed and perhaps even
required as a way of giving voice to some nonvoters who would otherwise not
be represented. 60 Including citizen children in the local apportionment base,
for instance, is not only desirable 6' but is also probably required
constitutionally,62 even though citizen children obviously cannot vote. For
legal aliens virtual representation is important because it means that they will
be accounted for in the legislature by inclusion in the population base-the
constituency for which the legislator secures government benefits.
Noncitizens do not have a constitutional right to be included in the local
apportionment base and thus do not have a constitutional right to virtual
representation. In Burns v. Richardson, the Court afforded local governments
broad latitude in defining their apportionment base to include or exclude
outsiders such as noncitizens, out-of-town students, nonresident military
personnel, transients, and convicted felons.63 In essence, the Court allowed
local governments broad discretion to choose between two radically different
visions: an exclusionary apportionment base that protects citizens' right to
voting equality and an inclusive apportionment base that ensures representation
for everyone, even those ineligible to vote.
57. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 161 (1980).
58. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 239-41 (1988).
59. See Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Instde-Outsider". 134 U. PA. L REv
1291, 1312-13 (1986). Until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. women had only vtrtual
representation. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United Stales to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."). Similarly. until passage
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 18- to 21-year-olds enjoyed only virtual representation. See :d. amend.
XXVI ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.").
60. Virtual representation is required at the federal level by the Enumeration Clause as amended by
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 2 ("Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers. counting the whole
number of the persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."). Thus persons ineligible to vote such
as aliens and citizen children are accorded virtual representation in Congress.
61. Cf. HAWAII REAPPORTIONMENT COMM'N, supra note 56, at 22.
62. No Supreme Court case is squarely on point, but several cases suggest that citizen children must
be included in the local apportionment base. Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735. 747 (1973) (implying
that children should not be excluded from local districts even if disparity in numbers of children in districts
leads to disparity in number of potential voters in each district): Bums v. Richardson. 384 U.S, 73. 92
(1966) (omitting children from list of groups that can be excluded from local apportionment base). At this
time, no state or local government excludes minor children from its apportionment base.
63. Bums, 384 U.S. at 92.
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Legal aliens may be excluded from the local apportionment base, provided
their exclusion is not discriminatory.' More than other groups of outsiders,
however, legal aliens warrant inclusion in the apportionment base for policy
reasons, both for their own sake and for the good of their citizen neighbors.
Legal aliens contribute to the community as much as citizens do. Legal aliens
pay all the same taxes,65 and were even conscripted into the military until the
draft was abolished.6 Like citizens, legal aliens depend on public schools,
hospitals, and libraries and rely on local government for police service, fire
protection, and garbage pickup. Many legal aliens sink roots deeply into the
local communities and may even spend the remainder of their lives there.67
For nearly all intents and purposes, legal aliens are indistinguishable from their
citizen neighbors. Hence, legal aliens should be included in the local
apportionment base in recognition both of their contributions to the community
and their dependence on the community.
Extending representation to legal aliens redounds to the benefit of the
entire community.6 8 In Dade and Los Angeles Counties, where one in three
64. See infra notes 130-60 and accompanying text.
65. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1445 (1993) ("[L]egal, resident aliens pay exactly
the amount of local property taxes, federal income taxes, state income taxes and state and local sales taxes
that they would pay if they were citizens." (citations omitted)). Illegal aliens are not exempt from paying
taxes, and indeed pay billions. One study found that in the seven states with the largest populations of
illegal aliens, such immigrants pay "$1.9 billion in state and local income taxes, sales taxes and property
taxes" and "some $3.4 billion in Federal income taxes." Sontag, supra note 11, at A14.
While suffrage is no longer limited to property owners and so merely paying taxes does not give legal
aliens a strong claim that they should be allowed to vote, it does provide a more compelling case for
according them representation. After all, one of the rallying cries of the American Revolution was "No
taxation without representation." MORGAN, supra note 58, at 239-41.
66. The Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(a), 62 Stat. 604, 609, exempted "[persons] residing
in the United States and who have not declared their intentions to become citizens" from the Act's
registration requirement. The Selective Service Act was amended by Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 144, sec.
2(c)-(d), §§ 3-4(a), 65 Stat. 75, 76, which removed this exemption for permanent resident aliens, regardless
of whether they had declared their intention to naturalize. The conscription requirements are now codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 454(a) (1988).
67. The Immigration and Naturalization Service found that 39.6% of all immigrants who entered the
United State lawfully in 1977 had naturalized as of end fiscal year 1992. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1993 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 130 tbl. L (1993). Further, a survey of Latino immigrants found that 76% of all Mexicans
questioned reported that they intended to remain in the United States permanently. RODOLFO 0. DE LA
GARZA ET AL., LATINO VOICES 155 (1992).
68. Since legal aliens are integrated into the local community, some commentators argue that legal
aliens should be allowed to vote, at least in local elections. States are free to decide whom to allow to vote,
within constitutional and statutory limits. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature."). Aliens voted in many states in the union in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The
last state to take the right to vote away from legal aliens did so in 1928. See Gerald L. Neuman, We Are
the People; Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259, 334 (1992)
(concluding that alien suffrage is constitutionally permissible in United States); Raskin, supra note 65, at
1394, 1466-67 (urging that aliens be allowed to vote in local elections); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1092 (1977) (proposing suffrage for legal
resident aliens).
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and one in four adults are noncitizens respectively, excluding noncitizens from
the local apportionment base would result in serious inequities in the delivery
of many services. 69 Even if excluded from the apportionment base,
noncitizens would remain physically present, swelling the real size of the
districts where they live. Citizens and noncitizens in the larger districts would
likely get short shrift in the legislature, as one of the judges in Garza noted,
for the real size of their district would increase but the resources devoted to
their district would not. "[A]ssuming that elected officials are able to obtain
benefits for their districts in proportion to their share of the total membership
of the governing body, [creating equally populous districts] ensures that
constituents are not afforded unequal government services depending on the
size of the population in their districts."7
Indeed, excluding noncitizens from the apportionment base would impose
greater hardships on a community than would excluding military personnel,
prison and psychiatric inmates, or college students. Such groups lead a more
insular, self-contained existence than legal aliens, and thus do not deplete the
state's resources to the same degree as legal aliens do. Prison inmates or
institutionalized psychiatric patients, for instance, place almost no demand on
generally available local services and contribute nothing to the local
community. Similarly college students living in dormitories and military
personnel living on federal bases most often lead lives apart from the
community, drawing on community services much less than the average area
resident does. In addition, many of these groups enjoy special services, such
as military hospitals or private university police, not paid for through general
tax revenues. Thus, from a policy perspective, legal aliens should be the last
group excluded from the local apportionment base, not the first one.
The Alaska Supreme Court emphasized the isolated nature of military life
in upholding the state's plan to exclude only nonresident military personnel
from the apportionment base for state legislative districts in 1973. The court
said the "fundamental reason" for excluding nonresident military personnel was
"their want of any contact with the state beyond mere presence." 7' To
buttress its position, the court reviewed the common law rule, later enacted
69. With the demise of the rights/privileges distinction, states cannot exclude legal aliens from access
to government services without triggering strict scrutiny. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
70. Garza, 918 F.2d at 778, 781 (Kozinski, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ironically.
Kozinski favored districts with equal numbers of citizens over districts with equal numbers of inhabitants
because he argued that electoral equality was more important than equal representation. Id. at 782.
New York's high court made a similar point about the delivery of government services in rejecting
a demand to exclude outsiders from the local apportionment base:
Military persons, children, mental patients and prisoners all affect the social and economic
character of their environments. Their impact results in employment opportunities and
contributes to the tax base. They also use services provided by the municipalities. Thus. their
inclusion for apportionment purposes makes sense on several levels.
Longway v. Jefferson County Bd. of Supervisors, 628 N.E.2d 1316. 1318 (N.Y. 1993)
71. Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 871 (Alaska 1974).
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into a federal statute,7z that people who enter the military do not lose their
prior residence unless they take affirmative steps to become residents of the
state in which they are stationed. The court observed, "[a]s a result of the
common and statutory law and the economics of military life, the serviceman
and his family may remain completely aloof from the state of assignment,
neither utilizing its services nor contributing to its treasury or public life.""
Legal aliens, by contrast, partake of life in the community just as much as
citizens, paying all taxes and drawing on all community services. Thus, the
ethical and policy arguments for including legal aliens in the local
apportionment base are quite strong.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The decision to include or exclude noncitizens does not take place in a
legal vacuum. The Constitution requires inclusion of all inhabitants in the
apportionment base for congressional districts but does not specify procedures
for drawing local districts or deciding who must be included. 74 For local
districting, the Court has invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the
72. 50 U.S.C. app. § 574(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This rule developed to prevent military
personnel from facing the burden of double taxation.
73. Groh, 526 P.2d at 872. Alaska's experience is not unique. Hawaii has found that only 3% of the
military officers stationed in Hawaii choose to become state citizens. HAWAII REAPPORTIONMENT COMM'N,
supra note 56, at 24.
74. For the federal apportionment base, the rule follows from the Enumeration Clause as modified by
the Fourteenth Amendment:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term
of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of the persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed."). The legislative histories of the original Enumeration Clause and of its
replacement, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, show that ineligible voters and noncitizens were
intentionally included in the congressional apportionment base. Federation for Am. Immigration Reform
(FAIR) v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 576 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, 447 U.S. 916 (1980); William W.
Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 33, 46-54; Note, A Territorial Approach to Representation for Illegal
Aliens, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1342, 1356-57 (1982) [hereinafter TerritorialApproach]. Lower courts have cited
that history in ruling that congressional districts must be apportioned on the basis of total population,
excluding only foreign tourists and foreign diplomats living on embassy grounds. In twin court rulings
about the 1980 and 1990 censuses, courts found that even illegal aliens, arguably the group with the
weakest claim to be included in the American political system, must be counted for congressional
apportionment. See also Ridge v. Verity, 715 F. Supp. 1308, 1321 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (upholding district
court's grant of summary judgment on grounds that plaintiffs failed to meet injury-in-fact and redressability
elements necessary for standing to challenge proposed inclusion of illegal aliens in 1990 census): FAIR,
486 F. Supp. at 576. But cf Dennis L. Murphy, Note, The Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from the
Reapportionment Base: A Question of Representation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969 (1991) [hereinafter
Question of Representation] (arguing that Congress can and should pass legislation excluding illegal aliens
from congressional apportionment base). FAIR and Ridge make it clear that legal aliens must, a fortiori,
be included in the congressional reapportionment base.
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Fourteenth Amendment, 75 not the Enumeration Clause, to derive the one-
person, one-vote mandate because the Constitution imposes only indirect
constraints on states' electoral practices.76 The Court has interpreted that
silence as meaning that local governments can exclude aliens, nonresident
military personnel, and out-of-town students from their apportionment base.'
Under that permissive framework, local governments could exclude legal aliens
subject only to rational basis review. 78 In 1971, however, the Court declared
alienage a suspect classification, automatically triggering strict scrutiny and
preventing states from excluding only aliens from their apportionment base
without compelling justification.
The Court's local apportionment cases reflect two competing models for
applying equal protection doctrine to defining the local apportionment base.
Unfortunately, the Court has endorsed both models as if they were
interchangeable. 79 As discussed in the previous Part, the two models-one
favoring electoral equality, the other equal representation-can lead to sharply
different results in areas with large noncitizen populations. Under the broad
framework established in Burns v. Richardson, however, either is
constitutionally permissible.' °
The question in Burns was whether Hawaii could draw legislative districts
based on voter registration rolls, rather than overall population figures. Hawaii
contended that including Hawaii-based military officers, most of whom were
neither permanent state residents nor registered voters, would distort the
apportionment process by unfairly favoring areas with military bases."' The
Court agreed and declared that states should be afforded broad deference in
defining their apportionment base:
[T]his Court [has never] suggested that the States are required to
include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons
denied the vote for conviction of crime in the apportionment base by
which their legislators are distributed and against which compliance
with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured. The decision to
75. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. 556-61 (1964).
76. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73. 91-92 (1966) (indicating that states' choices to include or
exclude aliens, transients, and other such groups from apportionment base do not. of themselves. violate
constitutional mandates).
77. Id.
78. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483. 488 (1955) (specifying rational basis review
standard).
79. For discussions of the ambiguity in the Court's pronouncements. see Garza. 918 12d. at 778.
780-82 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bilzain. supra note 55. at 238-47: John B.
Manning Jr., Case Comment, The Equal Protection Clause in District Reapportionment: Representational
Equality Versus Voting Equality-Garza v. County of Los Angeles. 25 SuFFOLK U. L RiV 1243. 1245-48
(1991); Dennis L. Murphy, Note, Garza v. County of Los Angeles: The Dilemnima over Using Elector
Population as Opposed to Total Population in Legislative Appointment. 41 CAsE W. REs. L. REv 1013,
1016-18 (1991).
80. 384 U.S. at 90-92.
81. See id. at 90-91.
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include or exclude any such group involves choices about the nature
of representation with which we have been shown no constitutionally
founded reason to interfere. 2
This passage indicates that local districts, unlike congressional districts, need
not be based on overall population figures. The Court explicitly disavowed
ever implying in earlier decisions that aliens and other groups whose members
are not entitled to vote must be included in the local apportionment base. 3
The Court clearly indicated that state citizenship' or federal citizenship is a
permissible basis for local apportionment. 5 Subsequent lower court cases
support this conclusion. 6 By establishing that noncitizens do not enjoy a
fundamental right to be represented in the apportionment base,8 7 Burns set a
lenient standard of review. Under Burns, governments must only show that
their policy is rationally related to a legitimate state goal-the most permissive
strand of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence 8 --in order to justify
excluding any outsider group.
Five years after granting local governments considerable latitude to
exclude noncitizens from their apportionment base in Burns, the Court declared
alienage a suspect classification in Graham v. Richardson."9 Because state
action on the basis of a suspect classification automatically triggers strict
scrutiny, the Court's decision in Graham modified its holding in Burns-a
state may constitutionally exclude all outsiders, but it cannot single out aliens
for particular treatment without a compelling state interest.90 A decade later
in Plyler v. Doe, the Court clarified that illegal aliens, in contrast to legal
aliens, are not a constitutionally protected group.9' Applied to the Burns and
82. Id. at 92 (footnote omitted).
83. Id.
84. State citizenship, as the Court used the term, would not include either aliens or citizens of another
state who were living in Hawaii but had not become Hawaii residents. See id. at 92, 94.
85. Id. at 95 ("It is enough if it appears that the distribution of registered voters approximates
distribution of state citizens or another permissible population base.").
86. See, e.g., Bacon v. Carlin, 575 F. Supp. 763,764 (D. Kan. 1983) (upholding Kansas apportionment
plan that excluded aliens, nonresident military personnel, and out-of-town college students), aff'd, 466 U.S.
966 (1984); Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308, 311 (D. Kan. 1974) (same).
87. Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
88. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993) (noting broad deference
accorded to legislative classifications subject to rational basis review).
89. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
90. While states cannot draw classifications based on alienage without triggering strict scrutiny, the
Supreme Court permits the federal government to draw alienage classifications subject only to limited
review in recognition of the federal government's plenary powers over immigration. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 791-92 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 n.21 (1976); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-84 (1976); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice
Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens. 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 51, 69 n.92 (1985). Even the federal
government, however, cannot exclude aliens from the federal apportionment base, although the prohibition
stems from the Enumeration Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
91. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) ("We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a
'suspect class."'). The Plyler Court, however, held that illegal aliens are entitled to minimum protection
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Graham framework, Plyler suggests that a local government could exclude
illegal aliens from its apportionment base subject only to rational basis review.
If that government sweeps too widely, attempting to exclude both legal and
illegal aliens, however, its plan would face strict scrutiny.9"2
To pass strict scrutiny, a government must show that its proposal is
necessary to serve a compelling state goal and that it does so by the least
restrictive means possible.93 That rigorous showing is designed to prevent the
government from unjustifiably burdening the exercise of fundamental rights or
from impermissibly discriminating against members of a suspect class such as
legal aliens who are politically vulnerable because they are not entitled to
vote.94
Strict scrutiny is usually "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," 5 while the
Court rarely invalidates legislation under rational basis review.96 Thus,
Graham and Plyler together mean that local governments would almost
certainly be permitted to exclude illegal aliens and barred from excluding legal
aliens; that is, if alienage were a typical suspect class. In Sugarman v. Dougall,
however, the Court announced the political function exception to strict scrutiny
for alienage classifications. 97 The Court held that states could constitutionally
exclude legal aliens from political or government employment that "go[es] to
the heart of representative government" without triggering strict scrutiny."
Since creating the political function exemption in 1973, the Court has not
upheld a single alienage classification that was subjected to strict scrutiny nor
struck down a single alienage classification that was encompassed by the
political function exemption. 99 Thus, a legal battle over a plan to exclude
under equal protection review. Id. at 210-13.
92. A court reviewing a plan to exclude both legal and illegal aliens could conceivably divide the
proposal into component parts and subject each to the appropriate level of scrutiny. The Court has heard
only one equal protection challenge to an alienage classification since it declared in Plyler that illegal aliens
do not constitute a suspect class. In Beral v. Fainter. 467 U.S. 216 (1984). the Court scrutinized a Texas
law that discriminated against legal and illegal aliens alike by requiring that notary publics be citizens. The
Court analyzed the statute under strict scrutiny, and did not treat legal and illegal aliens separately
93. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 ("With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce
the mandate of equal protection by requiring the state to demonstrate that its classification has been
precisely tailored to serve a compelling government interest.").
94. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSMTUiMONAL I.W § 16-6. at 1451 (2d ed. 1988). As the
Court has noted: "[PIrejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." United States v
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
95. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REv. I. 8 (1972)
96. Id.; see also Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEt. LIJ. 1787. 1787 (1992).
97. 413 U.S. 634, 647-49 (1973).
98. Id. at 647-48.
99. Compare Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny and sinking down
alienage classification); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1976) (same): Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero.
426 U.S. 572 (1976) (same); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (same); Sugarman. 413 U.S. 634 (same)
with Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (finding political function exception applies and
1995] 1459
The Yale Law Journal
noncitizens from the apportionment base would likely turn on whether the
political function exception applied.
III. THE POLITICAL FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The Court's political function exception only covers laws that exclude
legal aliens from holding important elected or appointed government positions.
In that political arena, the Court has decided not to treat alienage
classifications as inherently suspect since they serve a valid state goal by
limiting political participation to people who are full members of the body
politic. This Part argues that inclusion in the apportionment base does not
entitle aliens to hold important elective or appointed government office and so
does not fall within the political function exception.
To decide whether the political function exception applies to an exclusion
of legal aliens, it is helpful to place the doctrine in historical context. Before
the Court made aliens a suspect class in Graham, the Court embraced a special
public interest doctrine'0° that allowed states to discriminate against aliens
when dispensing "privileges" such as owning real property,'' hunting,
fishing,'0 3 bearing arms,"°4 and entering licensed professions.,05 When
states were enforcing "rights," primarily the right to hold private jobs in the
"common occupations of the community," however, the Court struck down
employment classifications based on alienage't 6 In Graham, the Court
rejected the special public interest doctrine as part of a dated and discredited
rights/privileges distinction and declared alienage a suspect classification for
all state action. 0 7
While this opinion standing alone would have permanently extinguished
the public interest doctrine, the Court resurrected limited state power to draw
alienage classifications only two years later in Sugarman v. Dougall."'0 In
that case, the Court replaced the discredited rights/privileges distinction with
a new dichotomy between the economic and political spheres. The thrust of the
upholding alienage classification); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (same); Foley v. Connelic, 435
U.S. 291 (1978) (same).
100. The most famous exposition of the public interest doctrine is found in an opinion by then Judge
Cardozo writing for New York State's high court in People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429-30 (N.Y.), aff'd
sub non. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
101. Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483 (1879).
102. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
103. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
104. Patsone, 232 U.S. at 143, 146.
105. Elizabeth Hull, Resident Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: The Burger Court's Retreat
from Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 10 (1980).
106. Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
107. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1971).
108. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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Court's pronouncement was that economic classifications based on alienage
would be subjected to strict scrutiny while political classifications barring
aliens from holding key positions in the body politic would be subject only to
rational review in recognition of the state's constitutional prerogatives as a
sovereign government. The Sugarman Court defined its new doctrine narrowly.
It held that states could set citizenship requirements that would apply "to
persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative,
and judicial positions" filled by "officers who participate directly in the
formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy" because such
officials "perform functions that go to the heart of representative
government."' 9 At issue in Sugannan was a state statute barring aliens from
applying to competitive civil service positions. The Court refused to apply the
political function exception because many, if not most, of the jobs covered by
the competitive class did not entail key government functions."
Several years later the Court enlarged the scope of the political function
exception by extending the range of nonelective jobs that "go to the heart of
representative government..... Over bitter dissents, the Court upheld statutes
prohibiting legal aliens from working as state troopers" 2 and as public
school teachers," 3 emphasizing the discretion and influence wielded by these
government officials. The dissenting Justices argued that the Court's decisions
were irreconcilable with Sugarman."' Commentators also charged the Court
with inconsistency." 5 The Court itself acknowledged that its decisions
"regarding the permissibility of statutory classifications involving legal aliens
have not formed an unwavering line.""' 6
109. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 642-43. In a closely related case, In re Griffiths. the Court also limited the reach of the
political function exception, rejecting Connecticut's assertion that the doctrine justified barring aliens from
taking the state bar exam. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). "It in no way denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities
to observe that the powers to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances. land) administer oaths hardly
involve matters of state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens-- Id.
at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I1. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
112. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291. 297 (1978) ("The essence of our holdings to date is that
although we extend to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with the ability to earn a
livelihood and engage in licensed professioas, the right to govern is reserved to citizens.").
113. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1979) ("IS]ome state functions are so bound up with
the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all
persons who have not become part of the process of self-government.").
114. See, e.g., Foley, 435 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (saying he could not fathom how
"inexplicably, every state trooper is transformed into a high ranking, policymaking official").
115. Hull, supra note 105, at 26; Michael J. Perry. Modern Equal Protection. 79 COLUt. L REV.
1023, 1064 (1979); David F. Levy, Note, The Equal Treatment of Ahens: Preemption or Equal Protection ,
31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070, 1091 (1979); Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimnation Against Aliens.
92 HARv. L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1979); Developments in the Law: Imnigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1406 (1983) [hereinafter Developmentsl; Frederick D. Unger. Recent
Decision, 31 EMORY LJ. 707, 738 (1982) (discussing Cabell v. Chavez-Salido. 454 U-S. 432 (1982)).
116. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 72.
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The Court attempted to reconcile its conflicting precedents and clarify the
scope of the political function doctrine in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido."7 In
deciding whether a state could permissibly condition employment as a
probation officer on citizenship, the Court expounded a two-part test:
Sugarman advised that a claim that a particular restriction on
legally resident aliens serves political and not economic goals is to be
evaluated in a two-step process. First, the specificity of the
classification will be examined: a classification that is substantially
overinclusive or underinclusive tends to undercut the governmental
claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends....
Second, even if the classification is sufficiently tailored, it may be
applied in the particular case only to "persons holding state elective
or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions,"
those officers who "participate directly in the formulation, execution,
or review of broad public policy" and hence "perform functions that
go to the heart of representative government." We must therefore
inquire whether the "position in question ... involves discretionary
decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects
members of the political community.""' 8
Underlying the second prong of the test-determining whether an official's
function goes to the heart of representative government-is the Court's view
that citizens, as full members of the body politic, should not be under the
direct or indirect control of noncitizens. The determinative factor in applying
the second prong is whether or not a particular position entails the exercise of
authority over citizens. If it does, eligibility can be limited to citizens." 9
Applying its two-part test, the Cabell Court held that since probation officers
exercise the state's sovereign power over citizen probationers, that position
comes within the ambit of the newly clarified doctrine. 20
Even under the most expansive reading of the Cabell test, however, the
political function exception does not extend to a statute barring legal aliens
117. 454 U.S. 432, 434 (1982).
118. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 US. 291, 296 (1978)).
119. Id. at 445 ("Looking at the functions of California probation officers, we conclude that they, like
the state troopers involved in Foley, sufficiently partake of the sovereign's power to exercise coercive force
over the individual that they may be limited to citizens."); see also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296
(1978) (citing Perkins v. Smith, 370 F Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976)) (approving
lower court decision barring aliens from serving as grand jurors or petit jurors because of power jurors
exercise over defendants); Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976) (holding that resident aliens were
not entitled to vote in local school board elections), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
120. Since Cabell, the Court has not tried to provide an operational definition of the political function
exception again, and has, in fact, heard only one other case focusing directly on the doctrine. In Bernal v.
Fainter, a case about a citizenship requirement for notary publics, the Court cited the Cabell test
approvingly, and explained the political function exception this way: "This exception . . . applies to laws
that exclude aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government." 467
U.S. 216, 220 (1984) (finding states cannot bar aliens from serving as notary publics). The Court also cited
the political function doctrine in Gregory v. Ashcroft, I I I S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (1991), as indirect support
for its holding that states may set qualifications for state judges.
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from the local apportionment base. Aliens included in the apportionment base
do not hold "elective or important nonelective executive, legislative or judicial
positions"12' no matter how capaciously one interprets the words "elective,"
"nonelective," or "important." Thus the political function exception does not
apply, and a plan to exclude legal aliens from the local apportionment base
should trigger strict scrutiny.
Indeed, the only Supreme Court case to consider whether the political
function exception should apply to an alienage classification that did not entail
a job or profession confirms this narrow reading. In Nyquist v. Mauclet,2'2
the Court fleshed out the vague contours of the doctrine in deciding an issue
similar to that presented in this Note. In that case, the Court rejected New
York's assertion that a law restricting college scholarships to citizens should
be covered by the political function exception because of the state's interest in
educating potential voters.123 The Court said:
[Tlhe Court [has] recognized that the State's interest "in establishing
its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that
government to those who are within the basic conception of a political
community" might justify some consideration of alienage. But as
Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's
historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of
voters, or of "elective or important nonelective" officials "who
participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy.'
124
The Court's holding and language in Nyquist confirmed that the political
function exception only extends to people who exercise important decision-
making powers.' 21 Aliens included in the apportionment base, however,
exercise no such power.
No judicial opinion has applied the political function exception to anything
but an alienage classification requiring citizenship as a prerequisite for entry
into certain jobs or professions.26 Invoking the doctrine to justify a
legislative plan to exclude legal aliens from the local apportionment base
would therefore be unprecedented and unjustifiable. It would also fly in the
121. Cabell, 454 U.S. at 440 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall. 413 U.S. 634. 647 (1973)).
122. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
123. Id at 9-10.
124. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted) (quoting Sugaman, 413 U.S. at 642. 647 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein.
405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972))).
125. Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. C. 2395. 2401-02 (1991) (upholding state authority to set
citizenship qualifications for its judges, describing political function precedents as "stand~ing) in recognition
of the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important
government officials") (footnote omitted).
126. See Koh, supra note 90, at 74 n.114. 75 n.116 (citing lower court cases in which poliucal
function exception did not apply and those in which it did); Developments, supra note 115. at 1404 n 35.
1405 n.44 (same).
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face of the Court's insistence that the political function exception not be read
expansively: "We emphasize, as we have in the past, that the political-function
exception must be narrowly construed; otherwise the exception will swallow
the rule and depreciate the significance that should attach to the designation of
a group as a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate.
'' 27
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY IN PRACTICE
Since the political function exception does not apply, proposals to exclude
only legal aliens from the local apportionment base must pass strict
scrutiny. 2 1 Under that standard, the Court strikes down "particular political
outcomes as insufficiently justified, either for their looseness of fit between
means and ends, or for the weakness of the interest they purport to serve.'
29
To pass strict scrutiny the state must satisfy a two-part test by showing that its
classification: (1) serves a compelling state interest, and (2) is the most
narrowly tailored means to achieve that goal. With one exception, the
justifications for excluding legal aliens from the local apportionment base do
not constitute a compelling state interest and thus fail the first prong. The one
exception is to avoid dilution of citizens' voting power. This Part argues that
even if a state claims to be excluding noncitizens from its apportionment base
to protect citizens' electoral equality, a statute excluding only legal aliens,
rather than all "outsider" groups, would fail the second prong of strict scrutiny
analysis. Because of the "looseness of fit" between the state's chosen means
and its stated end, the state could not demonstrate its statute was narrowly
tailored to further its stated goal.
While legal aliens do not have a constitutional right to be included in the
local apportionment base,130 they do have a legal right to equal access to
government services. A local government that excludes legal aliens from the
apportionment base in order to deprive them of government benefits would be
trying to accomplish indirectly what the Court has barred it from doing
directly. The Court has not only struck down the old public interest doctrine
that once was invoked to justify discriminatory treatment,' 3' but has also
barred local governments from burdening legal aliens under the federal
preemption doctrine because of the national government's plenary powers over
immigration matters.132 Excluding legal aliens from the apportionment base
127. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984) (citation omitted).
128. Similarly, local governments that want to exclude only legal aliens from the population base for
determining violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act must also meet strict scrutiny.
129. TRIBE, supra note 94, § 16-6, at 1453.
130. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
131. See sources cited supra notes 100-07.
132. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 (1982) (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,
419 (1948)); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971). Not only has Congress chosen not to
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to achieve the same impermissible purpose once served by the public interest
doctrine would similarly fail.
Only one state justification for exclusionary apportionment laws is
sufficiently compelling to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test:
preventing dilution of citizen voting power. The Court has stressed repeatedly,
in the most emphatic of terms, the importance of ensuring that citizens' votes
count equally. In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court declared, "To the extent that a
citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen."' 33 Similarly,
the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that excluding nonresident military
personnel from the local apportionment base could pass strict scrutiny because
doing so served "a compelling state interest, namely, the prevention of the
dilution of its residents' voting strength."' '
Even a state that says its apportionment plan is necessary to prevent
dilution of citizens' voting power still must satisfy the second prong of strict
scrutiny analysis. One commentator explained the purpose animating the
second prong's requirement for a tight fit between means and ends this way:
The "special scrutiny" that is afforded suspect classifications...
insists that the classification in issue fit the goal invoked in its defense
more closely than any alternative classification would. There is only
one goal the classification is likely to fit that closely, however, and
that is the goal the legislators actually had in mind. If that goal cannot
be invoked because it is unconstitutional, the classification will fall.
Thus functionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an
essentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of "flushing out"
unconstitutional motivation ... 
Under this test, a local government's assertion that it is excluding only legal
aliens from its apportionment base in order to avoid debasing citizens' voting
strength would be flushed out as discriminatory. A government sincerely trying
to avoid dilution of its citizens' voting strength should not care whether
someone is a legal alien from Mexico, a student from Mississippi, or a soldier
from Missouri. All are outsiders; all occupy a place in the apportionment base
that might otherwise be filled by a citizen. A local government that genuinely
wants to protect its citizens' voting power, and is not simply using that claim
burden resident aliens, but it has also-with help from the courts--bestowed on legal aliens nearly all the
rights enjoyed by citizens. Peter H. Schuck, Membershp in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of
American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. Li. 1. 5-7 (1989). Congress has neither sanctioned nor anticipated
any compelling interest that would serve as a justification for excluding only legal aliens from the local
apportionment base.
133. 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964); see also Garza, 918 F.2d at 778. 782-84 (Kozinski. J.. concumng in
part and dissenting in part) (citing cases stressing importance of protecung citizen's vote against dilution)
134. Carpenter v. Hammond. 667 P.2d 1204, 1213 (Alaska), appeal dismissed. 464 U-S. 810 (1983).
135. ELY, supra note 57, at 146.
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as a pretext for discrimination, should exclude all outsiders-unless some
outsiders are so few in number as to be statistically insignificant.
136
An example from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence helps illustrate
why an apportionment plan based on an alienage classification would not meet
the second prong of strict scrutiny analysis. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, the Court overturned a municipal requirement that group homes
for the mentally retarded secure a special zoning permit, finding the ordinance
violated the Equal Protection Clause.137 Because the Court decided the case
under lenient rational basis review, the Court did not scrutinize the importance
of the city's proffered goal, protecting the residential character of the
neighborhood, to determine whether it was compelling. Rather, the Court found
that the city's ordinance did not dovetail with that goal. The Court said that if
the city were serious about safeguarding its neighborhoods, the city would
have required special permits for all non-single-family dwellings instead of
adopting an ordinance singling out group homes for the mentally retarded.
Phrased differently, the city's ordinance was fatally underinclusive because it
irrationally targeted a small part of a larger problem. Thus, even under rational
basis review, the regulation was constitutionally infirm. As the Court
explained:
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is aimed at
avoiding concentration of population and at lessening congestion of
the streets. These concerns obviously fail to explain why apartment
houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the like, may
freely locate in the area without a permit. So, too, the expressed
worry about fire hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the
avoidance of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling
out a [group] home.., for the special use permit, yet imposing no
such restrictions on the many other uses freely permitted in the
neighborhood.
138
136. For apportionment cases involving local districts, the Court has accepted a population deviation
of up to 10% between districts as de minimis and presumptively valid. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755.
763 (1973).
137. 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
138. Id. at 448. In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court
applied strict scrutiny to a state law requiring corporations to pay for political advertising from special
segregated accounts and concluded that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause after
determining that the law was neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. Id. at 660-61, 665-66.
As we explained in the context of our discussions of whether the statute was 'overinclusivc'...
or 'underinclusive' ... the State's decision to regulate only corporations is precisely tailored
to serve the compelling state interest of eliminating from the political process the corrosive
effects of political "war chests" amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to
corporations.
Id.; see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 190, 191 n.1 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment) (defending lower court's remedial injunction against claim it violated Equal Protection Clause
and noting that "[b]ecause the decree is neither overinclusive, nor underinclusive, the metaphor of narrow
tailoring that is often used in considering the merits of claims based on the Equal Protection Clause simply
does not fit the issue before this Court"); Zablocki v. Redhai, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (1978) (applying strict
scrutiny to statute barring state residents delinquent in meeting child support payments from entering new
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The Cleburne Court found that the city's stated justification for its ordinance
was probably a pretext, concluded that the ordinance appeared "to rest on an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded,"' 39 and overturned the
ordinance as fatally underinclusive.'4
°
The same examination of the means-ends fit is required under strict
scrutiny, only with much greater rigor. Thus, a local government's claim that
it is protecting its citizens' electoral equality by excluding only legal aliens
from its apportionment base would meet the same fate as the municipal
ordinance in Cleburne. If other outsider groups, such as out-of-town students
and nonresident military personnel, also resided in the area in significant
numbers, the state could not justify treating legal aliens differently than it does
these groups. Hence, the Court would almost certainly overturn a
discriminatory plan after concluding that it appeared "to rest on an irrational
prejudice" against legal aliens.
Similarly, in Sugarman, the Court overturned a statute barring aliens from
New York's competitive civil service because the ban was both underinclusive
and overinclusive. 4 ' The Court concluded the ban was overinclusive because
it extended to jobs such as sanitation worker and typist, for which citizenship
was not even arguably relevant; it was underinclusive because it did not extend
to other important "elective and high appointive offices," for which citizenship
was likely to be important. 42 The Court summarized its findings this way:
It is at once apparent, however, that appellants' asserted justification
proves both too much and too little. As the above outline of the New
York scheme reveals, the State's broad prohibition of the employment
of aliens applies to many positions with respect to which the State's
proffered justification has little, if any, relationship. At the same time,
the prohibition has no application at all to positions that would seem
naturally to fall within the State's asserted purpose. Our standard of
review of statutes that treat aliens differently from citizens requires a
greater degree of precision. 13
marriage and concluding that statute violated Equal Protection Clause because it was "grossly
underinclusive" and "substantially overinclusive").
139. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
140. Ild. at 442-47. The Court also has applied a similar analysis outside the equal protection context.
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). a First Amendment case, the Court
struck down a municipal law banning animal sacrifices in religious rites as undennclusivc. The city claimed
the ordinance was designed to protect public health and prevent cruelty to animals, but the Court concluded
those justifications were merely pretextual because the ban extended almost solely to killing animals dunng
religious rituals. Id. at 2233-34.
141. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). see Cabell v. Chavez-Salido. 454 U.S 432, 440
(1982) ("[A] classification that is substantially overinclusive or undcnnclusive tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends."); see also discussion of political
function exception supra part Ill.
142. Suganan, 413 U.S. at 643.
143. Id. at 642.
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By greater precision, the Court means that statutes must be narrowly tailored
to pass strict scrutiny;144 that is, there must be a tight means-ends fit.
Applying the Court's equal protection approach to Garza shows that the
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors' proposal to exclude only
noncitizens (illegal and legal aliens) from the county's apportionment base
would not have passed strict scrutiny because it was fatally underinclusive. The
county's claim that its apportionment plan served a compelling need would
have been undermined by the county's failure to exclude other large groups of
outsiders from its apportionment base, especially nonresident military officers
and out-of-county students at numerous local colleges. 45 Similarly, in De
Grandy, the Florida legislature's proposal to adjust the "apportionment base"
used for determining compliance with the Voting Rights Act by excluding only
noncitizens would fail the strict scrutiny test.
Of course, a state could exclude only a certain group from its
apportionment base without triggering strict scrutiny if the excluded group
were not a suspect class. For example, an apportionment plan that excluded
only out-of-state students would be subjected to rational basis review because
students have not been considered a "discrete and insular minority" entitled to
heightened judicial protection. Indeed, College Park, Maryland, the home of
the University of Maryland's principal campus, has repeatedly passed
apportionment plans excluding students because nearly one in every three town
inhabitants is a university student. 46 Thus in Garza, Los Angeles County
could have excluded only illegal aliens from its apportionment base without
triggering strict scrutiny because illegal aliens do not constitute a suspect
class.'47 The county only would have had to demonstrate that its policy was
144. TRIBE, supra note 94, § 16-6, at 1453.
145. Garza, 918 F.2d at 763. The county criticized the court-ordered plan both because the districts
had different numbers of citizens and because they had different numbers of eligible voters. In its petition
for certiorari, the county said the first question presented by the case was as follows: "Whether the one-
person, one-vote, equal protection rule of Reynolds v. Sims requires single member districts to be equal
in population or equal in citizens (or eligible voters)?" Petition for Certiorari at i, Garza, 918 F.2d 763,
filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3421 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1990) (No. 90-849). Drawing the districts to exclude only
noncitizens would be unconstitutional for the reasons stated previously. Drawing the districts on the basis
of registered voters would also almost certainly be unconstitutional because doing so would discriminate
against groups whose members register at a below-average rate, including African-American citizens and
Hispanic citizens. See, e.g., Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 118-19 (1971) (explaining that voter registration
struck down on other grounds is also unconstitutional because it discriminates against Hispanics, Blacks,
Chicanos, and American Indians); Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554, 568-69 (D. Haw. 1982) (voiding
voter-registration-based plan in Hawaii, like the one approved in Burns, because drop in registration rates
meant new plan discriminated against minority citizens).
146. The courts, however, repeatedly struck down the town's reapportionment plans for failing to
distinguish between students who had not become state residents and so could be excluded and students
who had become state residents and so could not. DuBois v. City of College Park, 375 A.2d 1098 (Md.
1977), appeal after remand, 410 A.2d 577 (Md. 1980), appeal after remand, 447 A.2d 838 (Md. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
147. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
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rational and would probably have been able to withstand a challenge under this
lenient standard of review. 4 '
As a practical matter, however, excluding only illegal aliens is probably
not workable because it is difficult, if not impossible, to count illegal aliens.
The simplest approach, and the one suggested by the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR) in a 1980 lawsuit, is to subtract the number of
illegal aliens from the total population of the country.149 As one commentator
notes, however:
The main problem with this solution is that there is no assurance that
the total population counted includes all, or even most, of the illegal
aliens. If it does not, then the Bureau would be subtracting from
citizen population. The second problem is that estimates of the illegal
alien population range from three to twelve million. In short, no one
knows how many there are to subtract. 5 '
Applying FAIR's proposed methodology to the 1970 census yielded "a total
illegal alien count of minus 623,000."'' During a lawsuit about whether or
not illegal aliens should be counted in the 1990 federal census, one expert
estimated the number of illegal aliens in the country at between 1 and 5.6
million.
5 2
The Census Bureau does not even try to distinguish between legal and
illegal aliens and with good reason. 5 3 Any attempt to modify the census to
question aliens about their legal status is apt to discourage aliens from
148. As justification for its plan, the county could have asserted that it wanted to deny representauon
to people in the country illegally. While it is debatable whether or not including illegal aliens in the
apportionment base would accord them any effective representation, the Court has said that a policy whose
effectiveness or purpose is debatable is rational for the purposes of rational basis review. Heller v Doe ex
rel Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2646 (1993). Since the Court permits legislatures to approach problems
piecemeal under rational basis review, FCC v. Beach Communications. Inc.. 113 S. Ct. 2096. 2102 (1993).
the Court would probably uphold a plan to exclude only illegal aliens. \while the Court has satd
apportionment plans must be "'free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.'" Mahan v Howell.
410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973) (quoting Roman v. Sinock, 377 U.S. 695. 710 (1964)). excluding only illegal
aliens does not seem arbitrary.
149. Federation for Am. Immigration Reform (FAIR) v. Klutznick. 486 F. Supp. 564, 575 (D.D.C.).
appeal dismissed, 447 U.S. 916 (1980).
150. Territorial Approach, supra note 74, at 1364 (footnotes omitted).
151. FAIR, 486 F. Supp. at 573.
152. Ridge v. Verity, 715 F. Supp. 1308, 1314 n.3. 1319-21 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
153. After the 1980 census, two demographers with the Census Bureau estimated that the 1980 census
included 2,057,000 illegal aliens. Robert Warren & Jeffrey S. Passel. A Count of the Uncountable:
Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in 1980 United Stares Census, 24 DEM OGRAPttY 375. 382
(1987). The Census Bureau has no formal estimate for the number of illegal aliens counted in the 1990
census. It would be hard to make a reliable estimate because legal aliens are no longer required to register
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and those registration figures were a key part of the
methodology for calculating the number of illegal aliens in 1980. Id. at 392. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service, however, has provided estimates of the number of illegal aliens in the United States
The Service estimated 2.6 million illegal aliens were in the United States in 1990 and 3.2 million in 1992
Rebecca L. Clark & Jeffrey S. Passel, Dialogue-Immigrants: A Cost or a Benefit?: Studies Are Deceptnve.
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1993, at A23 (op-ed).
1995] 1469
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 104: 1441
cooperating with the census and so would decrease its overall accuracy. 54
Several courts have cited the near impossibility of counting illegal aliens as
one reason for not attempting to exclude them from congressional districts." 5
If illegal aliens cannot be counted with some degree of accuracy, they cannot
be excluded from the local apportionment base either.'
56
A state could also permissibly exclude all outsiders as Kansas did until
1990. 57 If challenged, the Kansas plan would not have been subject to strict
scrutiny because Kansas excluded not only aliens but also out-of-state students,
nonresident military personnel, and nonresident inhabitants of prisons, nursing
homes, and hospitals.' Thus the state did not impermissibly draw
distinctions based on alienage. Similarly, a state could choose among
nonsuspect groups in defining its apportionment base,'59 provided its decision
is not arbitrary.' 6 It could not, however, pick and choose among suspect
classes (e.g., legal aliens) without meeting strict scrutiny. States still enjoy
considerable flexibility in defining their apportionment base, but that flexibility
is not unlimited. Graham v. Richardson means states cannot pursue the goal
of greater electoral equality by sacrificing the equal representation rights of
aliens alone.
154. See Ridge, 715 F. Supp. at 1321; FAIR, 486 F. Supp. at 568 (summarizing argument of Census
Bureau); Note, Demography and Distrust: Constitutional Issues of the Federal Census, 94 HARV. L. REV.
841, 845-46 (1981).
155. Ridge, 715 F. Supp. at 1319-21; FAIR, 486 F. Supp. at 573-74.
156. How accurate such a count would have to be is a complicated question beyond the scope of this
Note.
157. BILL GRAVES, STATE OF KANSAS ADJUSTMENT TO THE 1990 U.S. DECENNIAL CENSUS 11 (1991)
(on file with author).
158. BILL GRAVES, 1988 KANSAS CENSUS 5 (1988) (on file with author); see also Bacon v. Carlin,
575 F Supp. 763, 764 (D. Kan. 1983) (challenging Kansas apportionment plan), aff'd, 466 U.S. 966
(1984); Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308, 311 (D. Kan. 1974) (same); Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp.
245, 246 (D. Kan. 1966) (same).
159. Within the last 30 years, three states-Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington-have excluded only
nonresident military personnel. See Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska) (upholding
apportionment plan that excluded nonresident military personnel and their dependents), appeal dismissed,
464 U.S. 801 (1983); HAWAII REAPPORTIONMENT COMM'N, supra note 56, at 21, 23 (noting that 14% of
Hawaii's population consists of nonresident military personnel and their dependents); Groh v. Egan, 526
P.2d 863, 873 (Alaska 1974) (discussing recent Washington plan that excluded nonresident military
personnel and noting that Washington's plan, which was not subject of published lower court decision, was
approved without comment by Supreme Court in Washington State Labor Council AFL-CIO v. Prince, 409
U.S. 808 (1972)). Cities and towns can also exclude outsiders who are not members of a suspect class
without triggering strict scrutiny. Knox County, Illinois, home of a large correctional center, excluded the
prison inmates from its apportionment base. Knox County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Knox County Bd.,
597 N.E.2d 238 (Il. App. CL), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 455 (II1. 1992). The Township of New Hanover,
New Jersey, which straddles part of Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base, excluded military personnel
because all but 256 of the township's 27,410 residents lived on one of the two military reservations. See
Marks v. Township Comm. of New Hanover, 308 A.2d 24, 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). The court
voided the plan because New Hanover failed to distinguish between resident and nonresident military
personnel. Id. at 25-27.
160. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-26 (1973); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92
(1966).
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V. CONCLUSION
The recent resurgence of nativism shows no signs of abating. The anti-
alien temper of the times began with calls to curtail services to illegal aliens
and to crack down on fraudulent asylum seekers. The rhetoric soon gave way
to action. Congress appropriated more money for extra border guards,'"" and
President Clinton upped the ante, seeking an extra $1 billion to apprehend
illegal aliens. 62 Clinton also proposed summary expulsion at the border for
people whose asylum claims are deemed frivolous and took administrative
steps to deport ineligible asylum seekers more quickly. 6 Florida began
deporting illegal aliens still serving state prison terms; California voters
resoundingly ratified Proposition 187, touted as the "Save Our State"
initiative.' 6' In time, the attack on illegal aliens spread to all aliens. House
Republicans, as part of the Contract with America, pledged to exclude legal
aliens from the welfare state, even though legal aliens' tax dollars would still
go toward programs for which they would no longer be eligible, including
Medicaid, food stamps, and welfare. Elected officials in Los Angeles County
and Florida proposed excluding all aliens from the apportionment base for
local districts and for calculating compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
With nativist sentiments still rising, other jurisdictions will be sorely
tempted to exclude aliens from their apportionment base. Incumbent politicians
will see such a strategy as a bulwark to protect their seats against the growing
clout of minority voters. Nativists will see it as a way to steer government
resources away from aliens. This Note is intended as a preemptive strike
against such exclusionary political tactics.
Together Burns and Graham mean that local governments cannot exclude
only legal aliens from their apportionment base, no matter how politically or
economically expedient doing so appears to be, without triggering strict
scrutiny. Cabell shows that the political function exception to strict scrutiny
does not immunize government plans to deprive legal aliens of virtual
representation by excluding them from the local apportionment base. Subjected
to the rigors of strict scrutiny, nativist-driven plans to exclude only legal aliens
cannot pass constitutional muster. Local governments that want to pursue
electoral equality cannot do so on the cheap; they must exclude all outsiders,
161. Deborah Sontag with Stephen Engelberg, Borders and Barriers. N.Y. T1IEs. Oct. 30. 1994. § I.
at 1.
162. Bennett Roth, The President's Budget; Immigration Plan Asks $ Billion More for INS, HOUSTON
CHRON., Feb. 7, 1995, at A6.
163. Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Seeks More Powers To Stem Illegal Immgraon. N Y. TI).MEs. July
28, 1993, at A13; Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Moves To Halt Abuses in Political Asylum Program, N Y
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, § 1, at 8.
164. Doreen Carvajal, Coalition Prepares To Battle -Save Our State" Proposition. LA. TIEs. Aug-
3, 1994, at B5.
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not just legal aliens, or their plan will fail the means-end test required under
strict scrutiny.
When the nativist winds howl, the Constitution will provide legal aliens
with some shelter. It should ensure at least that legal aliens are not the sole
group deleted from the local apportionment base.
